The Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets by Robert P. Flood & Mark P. Taylor
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets
Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey A. Frankel, Giampaolo Galli, Alberto
Giovannini, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-26000-3
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/fran96-1
Conference Date: July 1-2, 1994
Publication Date: January 1996
Chapter Title: Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the
Conventional Macro Approach?
Chapter Author: Robert P. Flood, Mark P. Taylor
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11368
Chapter pages in book: (p. 261 - 302)8 Exchange Rate Economics:
What's Wrong with the
Conventional Macro Approach?
Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
To include a paper entitled as this one is in a volume devoted to an examination
of the importance of market microstructure in foreign exchange markets is,
to utilize a well-used phrase, to preach to the converted. The poor empirical
performance of the major exchange rate models over the recent float is, more-
over, extremely well documented (Frankel and Rose 1994; MacDonald and
Taylor 1992; Taylor 1994). Nevertheless, it is important to have a formal state-
ment of the theory and evidence relating to exchange rate models based on
macroeconomic fundamentals as a ground-clearing exercise since only by stat-
ing what is wrong with the conventional macro approach can we hope to design
models that fill the gaps left by the macro-based models. Thus, section 8.1 of
this paper is devoted to a discussion of the theory and empirical evidence relat-
ing to the major macroeconomic exchange rate models developed during the
last twenty years or so, including the flexible-price monetary model, the sticky-
price, overshooting monetary model, the portfolio balance model, and the equi-
librium model. In section 8.2, we provide a brief discussion of the theory and
evidence relating to the speculative efficiency of foreign exchange markets.
Beyond this, however, we want to demonstrate that, while the macro funda-
mentals are clearly not capable of explaining all—or even most—of the varia-
tion in short-term nominal exchange rate movements, the research program of
the last twenty years has nevertheless not been entirely fruitless. Our aim is
thus to examine the macro fundamentals as a means of "setting the parameters"
within which microstructural models might be constructed. Thus, in section
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8.3, we invert the question posed in the title of this paper and ask, What's right
with the conventional macro approach? Using data on twenty-one industrial-
ized countries for the floating-rate period, we show that, while the macro fun-
damentals may be a poor guide to variations in short-run exchange rate move-
ments (where the short run is defined as one year or less), they may
nevertheless have considerable explanatory power over longer horizons.
A final section concludes the discussion and tries to give an answer to the
question that the title of this paper poses.
8.1 Theory and Evidence on Exchange Rate Models Based on
Macro Fundamentals
In this section, we review briefly the theory and evidence pertaining to the
four major exchange rate models based on conventional macro fundamentals:
the monetary model, the sticky-price monetary model, the equilibrium model,
and the portfolio balance model.' The monetary model is the simplest of the
four and assumes that all goods are perfect substitutes, as are all interest-
bearing assets, and that all markets clear continuously. The other three models
relax, in various ways, some of the strong assumptions made in the monetary
model and in some cases make explicit previously unarticulated assumptions.
The sticky-price model makes two big changes from the monetary model: it
adds multiple goods and allows slow adjustment of nominal goods prices. The
equilibrium model also allows multiple goods, but it models asset preferences
as depending on the covariation of real asset returns with the marginal utility
of consumption for some assets and as determined by unmodeled constraints
for other assets. Also, by paying explicit attention to individual and economy-
wide constraints, the equilibrium model is intended to clarify the full effects
of various policy options. Typically, equilibrium models require continuous
goods market and asset market clearing. Portfolio balance models are distin-
guished by their preferred specification of asset demands and are eclectic with
respect to goods market specifications. In portfolio balance models, different
interest-bearing assets are not perfect substitutes so that uncovered interest rate
parity does not hold and asset demands may be modeled along the lines sug-
gested by Tobin (1969).
Evidently, these four classes of model are not mutually exclusive. They share
many common structural elements, including the property that expectations of
the future are potentially crucial for current decisions, and, more important,
they all share the property that current and expected future macro fundamen-
tals are always at the heart of exchange rate determination.
Prior to setting out the theory and evidence relating to these four models in
detail, however, we consider what is probably the simplest and in many ways
1. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 draw on MacDonald and Taylor (1992) and Taylor (1994).263 Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Macro Approach?
the most fundamental link between the exchange rate and macroeconomic fun-
damentals: purchasing power parity.
8.1.1 Purchasing Power Parity
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is one of the simplest macro fundamental
exchange rate models that one can imagine. Absolute purchasing power parity
implies that the exchange rate is equal to the ratio of the two relevant national
price levels; relative purchasing power parity posits that changes in the ex-
change rate are equal to changes in relative national prices:
(1) s, = (p, - pt) + i.
and
(2) As, =
where sr denotes the logarithm of the spot exchange rate (domestic price of
foreign currency), and pt and p* denote the logarithms of suitably normalized
national price levels for the domestic and foreign economies, respectively. The
deviation from purchasing power parity is commonly referred to as the real
exchange rate, defined here in logarithmic form:
(3) ^, = st- (p, - p*) = (=,.
The professional consensus on the validity of purchasing power parity has
shifted radically over the past two decades or so. Prior to the recent float, the
consensus appeared to support the existence of a fairly stable real exchange
rate—that is to say, the variance of £, or ^ was thought of as small relative to
the variance in relative prices or relative inflation rates. The prevailing ortho-
doxy of the early 1970s, largely associated with the monetary approach to the
exchange rate, assumed the much stronger proposition of continuous purchas-
ing power parity—that is, that the variance of £r or %t was identically equal to
zero (see, e.g., Frenkel 1976; and Frenkel and Johnson 1978). Proponents of
early monetary exchange rate models, moreover, argued that, while the ex-
change rate may apparently diverge from PPP when conventional price indices
are used, the condition would be seen to hold if one could observe the "true"
price indices that are relevant for deflating national monies, so that observed
variation in £f or ^ was really due to variation in measurement errors.
In the mid- to late 1970s, in the light of the very high variability of real
exchange rates, this extreme position was largely abandoned as the variability
in observed deviations from PPP became so large that it became clear that they
could not be due to measurement errors alone. Subsequently, studies published
mostly in the 1980s, which could not reject the hypothesis of random-walk
behavior in real exchange rates—that £f or ir, followed a random walk (e.g.,
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power parity and led to the rather widespread belief that PPP was of little use
empirically and that real exchange rate movements were highly persistent.
More recently, in an extension of this literature, researchers have tested for
more general mean reversion or stationarity of the real exchange (where the
alternative hypothesis is a more general unit root process rather than specifi-
cally a random walk) have interpreted the null hypothesis of stationarity as
equivalent to the existence of long-run purchasing power parity. Relatedly, re-
searchers have also allowed the slope coefficients on domestic and foreign
prices to differ from unity by testing for cointegration between the nominal
exchange rate and domestic and foreign prices. Early cointegration studies
generally reported a failure of significant mean reversion of the exchange rate
toward purchasing power parity for the recent floating experience (Taylor
1988; Mark 1990) but were supportive of reversion toward purchasing power
parity notably for the interwar float (Taylor and McMahon 1988) and for the
exchange rates of high-inflation countries (McNown and Wallace 1989). Very
recent applied work on long-run purchasing power parity among the major
industrialized economies has, however, been more favorable toward the long-
run purchasing power parity hypothesis for the recent float (e.g., Cheung and
Lai 1993; Lothian and Taylor 1994). A number of authors have argued that the
data period for the recent float alone may simply be too short to provide any
reasonable degree of test power in the normal statistical tests for stationarity
of the real exchange rate (e.g., Frankel 1990).
8.1.2 The Flexible-Price Monetary Model
The monetary approach to the exchange rate, which emerged as the domi-
nant exchange rate model at the start of the recent float in the early 1970s (e.g.,
Frenkel 1976), starts from the definition of the exchange rate as the relative
price of two monies and attempts to model that relative price in terms of the
relative supply of and demand for those monies. Assuming stable, log-linear
money demand functions at home and abroad (all variables except interest rates
expressed in logarithms), the demand for money, m, is assumed to depend lin-
early on real income, y, the price level, p, and the level of the nominal interest
rate, / (foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk). Assuming continuous pur-
chasing power parity (£, = 0 in [1]), and substituting out for relative prices,
it is straightforward to derive the fundamental equation of the flexible-price
monetary model:
(4) st = mt- m* - K(yt - y) + 6(i, - i,'),
where K and 0 are the income elasticity and interest rate semielasticity of the
demand for money (here assumed equal at home and abroad for expository
purposes). By invoking the uncovered interest parity condition, we can substi-
tute As
et+l for (it — i*) in order to emphasize the forward-looking nature of
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(5) *, = <!>, ^+1
where cj>; is the monetary fundamental given by
(6) cj>, = m, - m* - K(V, - y*).
The rational expectations solution to (5) is
where E[- \ Clt] denotes the mathematical expectation conditioned on the infor-
mation set available at time t, (I,.
2 It is well known from the rational expecta-
tions literature, however, that equation (7) is only one solution to (5) from a
potentially infinite set involving rational bubbles.
Note that the flexible-price monetary model is really just a purchasing power
parity model of the exchange rate, where the proximate force driving relative
prices is assumed to be relative excess demand for money.
The very high volatility of real exchange rates during the 1970s float, con-
spicuously refuting the assumption of continuous purchasing power parity, led
to the development of two further models, the sticky-price monetary model
and the so-called equilibrium model. Both of these can be viewed as extensions
or modifications in some way of the flexible-price monetary model. Before
examining the empirical evidence on the flexible-price monetary model, we
give a brief exposition of the sticky-price monetary model.
8.1.3 The Sticky-Price Monetary Model
Sticky-price monetary models, due originally to Dornbusch (1976), allow
short-term overshooting of the nominal and real exchange rates above their
long-run equilibrium levels. This results as the "jump variables" in the system
(exchange rates and interest rates) compensate for stickiness in other vari-
ables—notably goods prices. The essential characteristics of the sticky-price
monetary model can be seen in a three-equation structural model in continuous
time, holding foreign variables and domestic income constant (these are sim-
plifying rather than necessary assumptions):
(8) s = i- i*,
(9) m = p + Ky - Qi,
(10) p = y[a + \x(s - p) - ijii - y].
Equation (8) is the uncovered interest parity condition expressed in continuous
time and utilizing certainty equivalence because of the linearity of the model.
2. The other three models that we will present below may similarly be represented in terms of
the entire expected future. We present that solution only for the model at hand and mention the
succeeding models' deviations from the monetary model.266 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
Equation (9) is a domestic money-market equilibrium condition, and equation
(10) is a Phillips curve relation, relating domestic price movements to excess
aggregate demand, where aggregate demand has an autonomous component, a
component depending on international competitiveness, and a component that
is interest rate sensitive.
3 If we use a bar to denote a variable in long-run (non-








The coefficient matrix in (11) has a negative determinant, so the system has
a unique convergent saddle path. The qualitative solution to (11) is shown in
figure 8.1, where the saddle path slopes down left to right in (s, /?)-space.
Monetary shocks will lead to overshooting in the model as the long-run
equilibrium relative price level—and hence the saddle path—shifts, causing a
discontinuous shift in the exchange rate onto the new saddle path, with prices
initially constant. This is then followed by a slower movement of prices and
the exchange rate toward the new equilibrium level.
Now consider the effects of a real shock to tastes for the domestic good as
opposed to the foreign good. Say, for example, that there is a permanent shift
in demand toward the home good, which would be represented by an increase
in a. In terms of figure 8.1, the effect of the shift is to displace the equilibrium
horizontally with the exchange rate fully and immediately making the adjust-
ment to bring relative international prices into equilibrium. Unless the demand
shift decays, there is no tendency for this disturbance's real effects to decrease
over time.
A useful way to rewrite the model in discrete time is
(12) sr = cj>, + z,
where cf>, is a monetary fundamental comparable to that defined in (6) and
(13) z, = 6r; + (i|i/n)r, + (r, - rj) (Xji) + (y -
and where rt is the real interest rate and z, reflects real goods market influences
on the nominal exchange rate for this case. It is immediately clear that shocks
3. For the sake of brevity, we are not distinguishing very carefully between the domestic price
level, which includes domestic currency prices of imported goods, and the domestic currency price
of domestic goods. If imported goods prices become sticky once they have been domestically
priced, then the distinction is unimportant.
As in the Dornbusch (1976) presentation, we allow goods demand to depend apparently on the
nominal rather than the real interest rate. We think of such a presentation in Dornbusch's terms as
a semi-reduced form in which the inflation terms have been aggregated on the equation's left-hand
side. Such complications have been clarified in the literature (Flood 1981), but none of them alter
very much the basic results of the Dornbusch model.
4. Note that the level of the money stock is exogenous to the model, assumed under the control
of the authorities. Thus, for any given level of the money stock, the perfect foresight equilibrium
involves assuming m = m.267 Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Macro Approach?
p = 0
s = 0
Fig. 8.1 The saddle path for the sticky-price monetary model
and influence z, make the sticky-price monetary model's predictions diverge
from those of the flexible-price monetary model, at least in the short run. To
the extent that shocks to zt are transitory, however, the differences between the
monetary and the sticky-price models are transitory also.
8.1.4 Empirical Evidence on the Flexible-Price and Sticky-Price
Monetary Models
Initial support for the flexible-price monetary model was provided by Fren-
kel (1976), who utilized data for the German mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate
during the German hyperinflation of the 1920s. The subsequent accumulation
of data for the 1970s float allowed estimation of the model for the major ex-
change rates during the recent float, and initial studies were also broadly sup-
portive of the flexible-price monetary model (e.g., Bilson 1978; and Dornbusch
1976). Beyond the late 1970s, however, the flexible-price monetary model (or
its real interest differential variant) ceases to provide a good explanation of
variations in exchange rate data: the estimated equations break down, provid-
ing poor fits, exhibiting incorrectly signed coefficients, and failing general
equation diagnostics (e.g., Frankel 1993).
The evidence for the sticky-price monetary model is also weak when the
data period is extended beyond the late 1970s (Backus 1984). Another implica-
tion of the sticky-price monetary model is proportional variation between the
real exchange rate and the real interest rate differential. This follows from the
basic assumptions of the overshooting model: slowly adjusting prices and un-
covered interest rate parity. A number of studies have failed to find strong evi-
dence of this relation, notably Meese and Rogoff (1988), who could not find
cointegration between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials.268 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
More recently, MacDonald and Taylor (1993, 1994) apply multivariate coin-
tegration analysis and dynamic modeling techniques to a number of exchange
rates and find some evidence to support the monetary model as a long-run
equilibrium toward which the exchange rate converges, while allowing for
complicated short-run dynamics. Since all the monetary models collapse to an
equilibrium condition of the form (6) in the long run, these tests have no power
to discriminate between the alternative varieties. The usefulness of the cointe-
gration approach suggested by these studies should, moreover, be taken as at
most tentative: their robustness across different data periods and exchange
rates has yet to be demonstrated.
8.1.5 The Portfolio Balance Model
The key distinguishing feature of the portfolio balance model is the assumed
imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets.
5 Consider a
simple model in which the net financial wealth of the private sector (W) is
divided into three components: money (M), domestically issued bonds (B), and
foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency and held by domestic residents
(B*). B can be thought of as a government debt held by the domestic private
sector; B* is the level of net claims on foreigners held by the private sector.
Since, under a free float, a current account surplus on the balance of payments
must be exactly matched by a capital account deficit (i.e., capital outflow and
hence an increase in net foreign indebtedness to the domestic economy), the
current account must give the rate of accumulation of B* over time. With for-
eign and domestic interest rates given by i and i* as before, we can write down
our definition of wealth and simple domestic demand functions for its compo-
nents as follows:
6
(14) W = M + B + SB*,
(15) M = Mii, i* + S
e)W, Ml <0,M2< 0,
(16) B = B(i, i* + S
e)W, #, > 0, B2 < 0,
(17) SB* = B*(i, i* + S
e)W, Bl <0,B2> 0,
(18) B* = T(S/P) + i*B*, r, > 0,
where S
e denotes the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency.
Relation (14) is an identity defining wealth and (15), (16), and (17) are stan-
dard asset demand functions.
7 Equation (18) gives the rate of change of B*, the
5. A comprehensive treatment of the portfolio balance model is given in Branson and Hender-
son (1985).
6. Xk denotes the partial derivative of X(-) with respect to the kth argument. The shift to upper-
case letters here indicates that variables are in levels rather than logarithms. As throughout, interest
rates are in percentage terms.
7. Note that, as is standard in most expositions of the portfolio balance model, the scale variable
is the level of wealth, W, and the demand functions are homogeneous in wealth; this allows them
to be written in nominal terms (assuming homogeneity in prices and real wealth, prices cancel out).269 Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Macro Approach?
capital account, as equal to the current account, which is in turn equal to the
sum of the trade balance, T(-), and net debt service receipts, i*B*. The trade
balance depends positively on the level of the real exchange rate (a devaluation
improves the trade balance). The exchange rate is then determined by solving
equations (14)—(18) for given levels of M, B, and B*, normally assuming ratio-
nal expectations. Disturbances to these stocks will result in movements in S in
both the short run (solve [14]—[18] allowing the left-hand side of [18] to be
nonzero) and the long run (impose the constraint that all asset levels are con-
stant). More structure can be put on the model by assuming that the asset de-
mand functions are determined by agents optimizing a function of the mean
and variance of their end-of-period wealth.
8.1.6 Empirical Evidence on the Portfolio Balance Model
Log-linear versions of reduced-form portfolio balance exchange rate equa-
tions, using cumulated current accounts for the stock of foreign assets, have,
however, been estimated for many of the major exchange rates for the 1970s
float, with poor results: estimated coefficients are often insignificant, and there
is a persistent problem of residual autocorrelation (e.g., Branson, Halttunen,
and Masson 1977; Frankel 1993; see also Lewis 1988).
The imperfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets that is assumed
in the portfolio balance model is equivalent to assuming that there is a risk
premium separating expected depreciation and the domestic-foreign interest
differential, and in the portfolio balance model this risk premium will be a
function of relative domestic and foreign debt outstanding. An alternative, indi-
rect method of testing the portfolio balance model, therefore, is to test for em-
pirical relations of this kind. Investigations of this kind have usually reported
statistically insignificant relations (see Frankel 1982; and Rogoff 1984). In a
recent study of the effectiveness of exchange rate intervention for dollar/mark
and dollar/Swiss franc during the 1980s, Dominguez and Frankel (1993) mea-
sure the risk premium using survey data and show that the resulting measure
can in fact be explained by an empirical model that is consistent with the port-
folio balance model, with the additional assumption of mean-variance optimi-
zation on the part of investors. In some ways, the relative success of the Domin-
guez and Frankel (1993) study is consistent with the recent empirical literature
on foreign exchange market efficiency, discussed below, which suggests the
existence of significant foreign exchange risk premia and nonrational expecta-
tions.
8.1.7 The Equilibrium Model
Equilibrium exchange rate models of the type developed originally by
Stockman (1980) and Lucas (1982) analyze the general equilibrium of a two-
country model by maximizing the expected present value of a representative
agent's utility, subject to budget constraints and cash-in-advance constraints
(by convention, agents are required to hold local currency, the accepted me-270 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
foreign goods
Fig. 8.2 A simple equilibrium exchange rate model
dium of exchange, with which to purchase goods).
8 In an important sense,
equilibrium models are an extension or a generalization of the flexible-price
monetary model to allow for multiple traded goods and real shocks across
countries.
A simple equilibrium model can be sketched as follows. Consider a two-
country, two-good world in which prices are flexible and markets are in equi-
librium, as in the flexible-price monetary model, but in which, in contrast to
the monetary model, agents distinguish between domestic and foreign goods
in terms of well-defined preferences. Further, for simplicity, assume that all
agents, domestic or foreign, have identical preferences. Then, given domestic
and foreign output of y and v*, respectively, the equilibrium relative price of
foreign output, say II, must be the slope of a representative agent's indifference
curve at the point (y*/n, yln) in foreign-domestic output per capita space
(where nil is the number of individuals in each economy), as in figure 8.2. But
the relative price of foreign output is the real exchange rate, which is defined
in logarithmic form (IT) by (3). Now consider log-linear domestic and foreign
money demand functions for the representative agent:
(19)
(20) * = P* +
8. For a more extensive, largely nontechnical exposition, see Stockman (1987). This literature
is an offshoot of the real business cycle literature.271 Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Macro Approach?
foreign goods
Fig. 8.3 The real exchange rate effect of a preference shift toward domestic
goods in the equilibrium model
which, in an optimizing framework, can be interpreted as linearizations of ex-
pressions derived from maximizing the representative agent's utility function
subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, assuming that government policy (and
other influences on the constancy of parameters) remains constant. Combining
these with the definition of the real exchange rate, (3), and solving for the
nominal exchange rate, we can derive
(21) s, = mt - rn, - K(y, - y,*) + IT,.
Equation (21) represents a very simple formulation of nominal exchange
rate determination in the equilibrium model. At first sight, it appears to be a
simple modification of the monetary model. Indeed, relative monetary expan-
sion leads to a depreciation of the domestic currency as in the simple monetary
model. However, as an example of a situation that it would be impossible to
analyze in a flexible-price monetary model, consider an exogenous shift in
preferences away from foreign goods toward domestic goods, represented as a
flattening of indifference curves as in figure 8.3 (from /, to /2). With per capita
outputs fixed, this implies a fall in the relative price of foreign output (or, con-
versely, a rise in the relative price of domestic output)—II falls (from II, to
Il2 in fig. 8.3).
9 Assuming unchanged monetary policies, this movement in the
9. Note that uppercase pi denotes the real exchange rate, lowercase pi the logarithm of the real
exchange rate.272 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
real exchange rate will, however, be brought about entirely (and swiftly) by a
movement in the nominal exchange rate without any movement in national
price levels. Thus, demand shirts are capable of explaining the observed vola-
tility of nominal exchange rates in excess of volatility in relative prices in equi-
librium models. The fall in s, in this case matching the fall in IT, will be ob-
served as a decline in domestic competitiveness.
1
0
8.1.8 Empirical Evidence on the Equilibrium Model
Although there is, in principle, no reason why a linearized version of the
equilibrium model should not be estimated, advocates of this approach have
preferred to point to the "consistency" of the model with the observed behavior
of exchange rates. Well-known, stylized facts of the recent float include the
high volatility and correlation of real and nominal exchange rates and the ab-
sence of strong mean-reverting properties in either series. As we noted above,
equilibrium models are capable of explaining the variability of nominal ex-
change rates in excess of relative price variability (and hence the variability of
real exchange rates), but so is the sticky-price monetary model. Some authors
have argued, however, that the difficulty that researchers have experienced in
rejecting the hypothesis of nonstationarity in the real exchange rate is evidence
against the sticky-price model and in favor of equilibrium models since the
former class of models requires some sort of long-run convergence of the real
exchange rate toward PPP, while an equilibrium model characterized by
random-walk innovations to taste and technology would generate a nonstation-
ary real exchange rate. Explaining the persistence in both real and nominal
exchange rates over the recent float within the framework of the sticky-price
model, it is argued, involves assuming either implausibly sluggish price adjust-
ment or else that movements in nominal exchange rates are due largely to per-
manent real disturbances (e.g., Stockman 1987).
This line of argument overlooks, however, the fact that relative shocks to
tastes and technology between countries are more likely to be mean reverting
(e.g., because of technology transfer). Moreover, as Frankel (1990) argues
forcibly, noncontradiction is not the same as confirmation: simply being con-
sistent with the facts is not enough to demonstrate the empirical validity of
a theory.
One testable implication of the simplest equilibrium models is the neutrality
of the exchange rate with respect to the exchange rate regime: since the real
exchange rate is determined by real variables such as tastes and technology, its
10. In the simple equilibrium model that we have sketched here, we have implicitly made a host
of simplifying assumptions. Chief among these is the assumption that individuals in either econ-
omy hold exactly the same fractions of their wealth in any firm, domestic or foreign. If this as-
sumption is violated, then supply and demand shifts will alter the relative distribution of wealth
between domestic and foreign residents as, e.g., one country becomes relatively more productive.
This, in turn, will affect the equilibrium level of the exchange rate (Stockman 1987).273 Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Macro Approach?
behavior ought to be independent of whether the nominal exchange rate is
pegged or allowed to float freely. Using data for a large number of countries
and time periods, however, researchers have invariably found that real ex-
change rates are significantly more volatile under floating nominal rate regimes
(Stockman 1983; Mussa 1986; Baxter and Stockman 1989).
Although this evidence does, indeed, constitute a rejection of the simplest
equilibrium models, it is possible that the evidence is to some extent con-
founded by the endogeneity of the choice of exchange rate regime—that is,
countries experiencing greater real disturbances are more likely to choose
flexible exchange rate systems. Moreover, Stockman (1983) also shows that
the assumptions necessary for regime neutrality are in fact quite restrictive in
a fully specified equilibrium model and include Ricardian equivalence, no
wealth-distribution effects of nominal price changes, no real effects of infla-
tion, no real effects of changes in the level of the money supply, complete asset
markets, completely flexible prices, and identical sets of government policies
under different exchange rate systems. Since it is unlikely that all these condi-
tions will be met in practice, Stockman argues that only the simplest class of
equilibrium models should be rejected and that equilibrium models should be
developed that relax some or all of these assumptions. Moreover, Stockman
(1988) argues that, because of the increased likelihood of countries with fixed
exchange rates introducing controls on trade or capital flows, a disturbance that
would tend to raise the relative price of foreign goods (e.g., a preference shift
toward foreign goods) will raise the probability that the domestic country will,
at some future point, impose capital or trade restrictions that will raise the
future relative world price of domestic goods. With intertemporal substitution,
this induces a higher world demand for domestic goods now, serving to offset
partly the direct effect of the disturbance, which was to raise the relative price
of the foreign good, and hence to reduce the resulting movement in the real
exchange rate. Thus, countries with pegged exchange rates will experience
lower volatility in the real exchange rate than countries with flexible ex-
change rates.
This discussion makes clear that the equilibrium model is not so much a
model as a way of viewing the world in strictly equilibrium terms. In particular,
it is not clear exactly what the proponents of this approach would accept as a
decisive rejection of the model.
8.1.9 Forecasting with Macro-Based Exchange Rate Models
In a landmark paper, Meese and Rogoff (1983a) compare the out-of-sample
forecasts produced by various macro-based exchange rate models with fore-
casts produced by a random-walk model, by the forward exchange rate, by a
univariate regression of the spot rate, and by a vector autoregression. They use
rolling regressions to generate a succession of out-of-sample forecasts for each
model and for various time horizons. The conclusion that emerges from this274 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
study is that, on a comparison of root mean square errors (RMSEs), none of
the asset market exchange rate models outperforms the simple random walk."
Further work by the same authors (Meese and Rogoff 1983b) suggested that
the estimated models may have been affected by simultaneity bias. Imposing
coefficient constraints taken from the empirical literature on money demand,
Meese and Rogoff find that, although the coefficient-constrained asset reduced
forms still fail to outperform the random-walk model for most horizons up to
a year, combinations of parameter constraints can be found such that the mod-
els do outperform the random-walk model for horizons beyond twelve months.
Even at these longer horizons, however, the models are unstable in the sense
that the minimum RMSE models have different coefficient values at different
horizons.
Although beating the random walk still remains the standard metric in which
to judge empirical exchange rate models, researchers have found that one key
to improving forecast performance based on economic fundamentals lies in
the introduction of equation dynamics. This has been done in various ways: by
using dynamic forecasting equations for the forcing variables in the forward-
looking, rational expectations version of the flexible-price monetary model, by
incorporating dynamic partial adjustment terms into the estimating equation,
by using time-varying parameter estimation techniques, and—most recently—
by using dynamic error correction forms (Throop 1993; MacDonald and Taylor
1993, 1994; Mark 1992).
8.2 Speculative Efficiency
In tandem with work on macro-based exchange rate models, there has devel-
oped a whole body of literature on the speculative efficiency of foreign ex-
change markets. This literature is important in the present context for at least
three reasons. First, efficiency conditions such as uncovered interest parity are
often used as building blocks in constructing macro-based exchange rate mod-
els. Second, the empirical literature of the efficiency of the foreign exchange
market has thrown up a number of stylized facts (indeed, anomalies) that pro-
vide a challenge for models of foreign exchange market microstructure to ex-
plain. Third, and most important, a standard route by which market microstruc-
ture has traditionally been dismissed is via the assumption of market efficiency.
If, indeed, smart speculators always tend to dominate in the foreign exchange
market, as Friedman's classic apologia of floating exchange rates argues (Fried-
man 1953), then the aggregate behavior of foreign exchange markets can in
fact be summarized by a handful of parity conditions that characterize the mar-
11. Meese and Rogoff (1983a) compare random-walk forecasts with those produced by the
flexible-price monetary model, Frankel's (1979) real interest rate differential variant of the mone-
tary model, and a synthesis of the monetary and portfolio balance models suggested by Hooper
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ket equilibrium. For the purposes of market efficiency, the most important par-
ity condition that researchers have considered is that of uncovered interest
rate parity.
If the risk-neutral efficient markets hypothesis holds, then the expected for-
eign exchange gain from holding one currency rather than another (the ex-
pected exchange rate change) must be just offset by the opportunity cost of
holding funds in this currency rather than the other (the interest rate differen-
tial). This is the uncovered interest rate parity condition:
(22) \sl+k = i, - /;.
Researchers have most often tested uncovered interest rate parity by
regression-based analyses of spot and forward exchange rates. Assuming cov-
ered interest parity, the interest rate differential should be just equal to the
forward premium. Under rational expectations, the expected change in the ex-
change rate should differ from the actual change only by a rational expecta-
tions forecast error. Hence, the uncovered interest rate parity condition (26)
can be tested by estimating a regression equation of the form
(23) Akst+k = a + 3 (/« - s,) + f]t+k,
where/* is the logarithm of the forward rate for maturity k periods ahead. If
agents are risk neutral and have rational expectations, we should expect the
slope parameter, (3, to be equal to one and the disturbance term r\l+k—the ratio-
nal expectations forecast error under the null hypothesis—to be uncorrelated
with information available at time t. Empirical studies of (23), for a large vari-
ety of currencies and time periods, for the recent floating experience generally
report results that are unfavorable to the efficient markets hypothesis under risk
neutrality (e.g., Fama 1984). Indeed, it is a stylized fact that estimates of (3,
using exchange rates against the dollar, are generally closer to minus unity than
plus unity (Froot and Thaler 1990).
1
2
The rejection of the simple, risk-neutral efficient markets hypothesis may
be due to the risk aversion of market participants or to a departure from the
pure rational expectations hypothesis, or both. If foreign exchange market par-
ticipants are risk averse, the uncovered interest parity condition (22) may be
distorted by a risk premium. If the risk premium is time varying and correlated
with the forward premium or the interest rate differential, this would confound
efficiency tests of the kind outlined above (Fama 1984). This reasoning has led
to a search for stable empirical models of the risk premium on the assumption
of rational expectations. Because of the theoretical relation between risk and
the second moments of asset price distributions, researchers have often tested
12. Alternatively, researchers have imposed 3 = 1 in equations such as (23) and tested the
orthogonality of the error term, r\l+k, with respect to information available at time /. Such tests
have also generally rejected the simple speculative efficiency hypothesis (see, e.g., Hodrick 1987).276 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
for a risk premium as a function of the variance of forecast errors or of ex-
change rate movements (Frankel 1982; Domowitz and Hakkio 1985; Giovan-
nini and Jorion 1989). In common with other empirical risk premium models,
such as latent variables formulations (Hansen and Hodrick 1983), such models
have generally met with mixed and somewhat limited success and have not
been found to be robust when applied to different data sets and sample periods.
In sum, it appears that, for credible degrees of risk aversion, empirical risk
premium models have so far been unable to explain to any significant degree
the variation in the excess return from forward market speculation.
An alternative explanation of the rejection of the simple efficient markets
hypothesis is that there is a failure, in some sense, of the expectations compo-
nent of the joint hypothesis. Examples in this group are the "peso problem"
suggested by Kenneth Rogoff (1979), rational bubbles, learning about regime
shifts (Lewis 1989), or inefficient information processing (as suggested, e.g.,
by John Bilson [1981]). The peso problem refers to the situation where agents
attach a small probability to a large change in the economic fundamentals,
which does not occur in sample. This will tend to produce a skew in the distri-
bution of forecast errors even if agents' expectations are rational and thus may
generate apparent evidence of nonzero excess returns from forward specula-
tion. In common with peso problems, the presence of rational bubbles may
also show up as nonzero excess returns even when agents are risk neutral. Sim-
ilarly, when agents are learning about their environment, they may be unable
fully to exploit arbitrage opportunities that are apparent in the data ex post.
A problem with admitting peso problems, bubbles, or learning into the class
of explanations of the forward discount bias is that, as noted above, a very
large number of econometric studies—encompassing an even larger range
of exchange rates and sample periods—have found that the direction of bias
is the same, that is, that the estimated uncovered interest rate parity slope
parameter, (3 in (23), is generally negative and closer to minus unity than plus
unity.
A problem with much of the empirical work on the possible rationalizations
of the rejection of the simple, risk-neutral efficient markets hypothesis is that,
in testing one leg of the joint hypothesis, researchers have typically assumed
that the other leg is true. For instance, the search for a stable empirical risk
premium model has generally been conditioned on the assumption of rational
expectations. Thus, some researchers have employed survey data on exchange
rate expectations to conduct tests of each component of the joint hypothesis
(Froot and Frankel 1989). In general, the overall conclusion that emerges from
survey data studies appears to be that both risk aversion and departures from




13. For surveys of the literature on foreign exchange risk premia, see Frankel (1988) and
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8.3 What's Right with the Conventional Macro Approach?
In this section, we present some further empirical evidence on the relation
between exchange rate movements and macroeconomic fundamentals by ex-
amining the purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity condi-
tions, using panel data for twenty-two countries.
1
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8.3.1 Purchasing Power Parity
Consider again the simple purchasing power parity equations (1) and (2),
reproduced here with time-series disturbances £r and et and slope parameters
P and y:
(24) s, = P(ft - pt) + i,
(25) As, = y(Apt - Atf) + £.
Estimation of these relations (with a constant term added) for dollar/sterling




(26) s, = 0.671 + 0.734(/?, - p*t) + %,
R
2 = 0.31, DW = 0.51, ADF = 2.25;
(27) As, = -0.039 - 0.235(Ap, - Ap*) + £,
(0.044) (1.266)
R
2 = 0.001, DW = 1.29;
dollar/mark
(28) st = -0.535 + 0.606(/?, - p*t) + |,,
R
2 = 0.30, DW = 0.85, ADF =1.13;
(29) As, = 0.009 + 0.408(Apr - Ap*t) + £,
(0.046) (0.861)
R
2 = 0.008, DW = 1.89.
14. We are, of course, not the first researchers to examine the PPP relation using panel data.
Officer (1980), e.g., finds a broadly proportional relation between the rate of depreciation and
relative inflation for a similar group of countries to those examined below, for the period 1913-75.
MacDonald (1988) uses a variety of estimation techniques on pooled annual time-series cross-
sectional data for the G-5 countries plus Switzerland and provides evidence supportive of rela-
tive PPP.
15. The data used in this section are annual observations taken from the International Monetary
Fund's International Financial Statistics CD-rom database: exchange rates are usually line ae,
prices are CPI (line 64), output is real GDP (line 99b. r), and interest rates are mainly three-month
Treasury bill rates (line 60c).
Figures in parentheses are heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, fl
2 denotes the coefficient
of determination, DW the Durbin-Watson statistic, and ADF the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic
applied to the estimated residuals. The individual series were found to be approximately 1(1), so
the estimated standard errors are not reported for the levels regressions.278 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
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Fig. 8.4 Scatter plot of annual exchange rate change against annual inflation
differential
These equations are typical of single-equation results reported in the litera-
ture for the recent floating-rate period: there is no apparent sign of cointegra-
tion of the exchange rate and relative prices, and relative inflation explains less
than 1 percent of the time-series variation in the nominal exchange rate.
In figure 8.4, we have plotted the annual exchange rate change against the
annual inflation differential for twenty-one industrialized countries against the
United States for the period 1973-92.
1
6 This scatter plot is vaguely suggestive
of a positive linear relation between the rate of depreciation and the inflation
differential, especially for large inflation differentials.
In figure 8.5, we also plot the annual rate of depreciation against the United
States, but this time using five-year averages (four for each country, corre-
sponding to the periods 1973-77, 1978-82, and 1983-87, and 1988-92). Fig-
ure 8.5 appears to reveal a stronger medium-term relation between the ex-
change rate and relative inflation, in the sense that the scatter is much closer to
the forty-five-degree line, albeit with one or two outliers. When the data are
averaged over periods of ten or twenty years (figs. 8.6 and 8.7, respectively),
the proportionality between average relative inflation and average depreciation
becomes even more marked, as the scatter more or less collapses onto the
forty-five-degree ray.
These visual impressions are largely confirmed by regression analysis, the
full results of which are given in the appendix. By simply pooling the twenty
years of data on annual changes, for example, we obtained the following
pooled estimate:
16. The countries besides the United States included in the sample are Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United King-
dom. All data were taken from the IFS database.-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Fig. 8.5 Scatter plot of five-year average exchange rate change against five-year
average inflation differential
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Fig. 8.6 Scatter plot of ten-year average exchange rate change against ten-year
average inflation differential
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Fig. 8.7 Scatter plot of twenty-year average exchange rate change against
twenty-year average inflation differential280 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
(30) As, = 0.022 -0.109(Ap, - A/?,*) + £,
(0.007) (0.108)
R
2 = 0.003, pooled data, annual changes, whole sample, N = 420.
Clearly, there appears to be little gained from pooling the annual changes,
with less than 1 percent of the pooled variation in the rate of depreciation being
explained by relative inflation. However, in a pooled regression consisting of
the four five-year average annual rates of depreciation for each country against
the corresponding five-year average annual inflation differential, we obtained
(31) As, = 0.356 + 0.807 (Ap, - ApJ) + £,
(0.742) (0.159)
R
2 — 0.432, pooled data, five-year-average changes, whole sample, N = 84.
Equation (31) explains over 40 percent of the pooled variation in the rate of
depreciation, the slope coefficient is strongly significantly different from zero
but insignificantly different from unity, and the intercept term is insignificantly
different from zero. Moreover, ordering the data in increasing order of absolute
magnitude of the difference in five-year average annual inflation rates, we ob-
tained for the fourth quartile
(32) As, - -0.764 + 0.960(Ap", - Atf) + £,
(2.077) (0.227)
R
2 — 0.695, pooled data, five-year-average changes, fourth quartile, N — 21.
Nearly 70 percent of the pooled variation in the rate of depreciation is ex-
plained, and the point estimate of the slope coefficient is very close to unity.
The results for the fourth quartile using five-year averages are broadly echoed
for the whole-sample estimates using ten- and twenty-year averages. For the
ten-year averages, for example, we obtained
(33) As, = 0.165 + 0.967(Kpt ~ Apr*) + £,
(0.722) (0.129)
R
2 = 0.693, pooled data, ten-year-average changes, whole sample, N = 21.
The strength of the relative PPP relation in the time-averaged data is quite
intriguing, and we provide an interpretation of these results below. Before do-
ing so, however, we present the results of analyzing the uncovered interest
parity relation using panel data.
1
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8.3.2 Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
Although it is not unusual to use low-frequency data when examining pur-
chasing power parity, researchers are usually much more fastidious in their
treatment of data for efficiency conditions such as uncovered interest rate par-
17. Although, as noted above, we are not the first researchers to examine PPP using panel data,
we are unaware of any previous study that applies time-averaged panel data to study the uncovered
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ity and covered interest rate parity (see, e.g., Hodrick 1987; Taylor 1988,
1989). This is for good reasons—namely, that tiny mismatches or imperfec-
tions in the data may be mistaken for arbitrage opportunities that, although
small in size, would nevertheless be highly profitable for a foreign exchange
market participant moving around very large sums of money. In the present
context, however, we are concerned with looking at uncovered interest rate
parity in very broad terms, to see whether interest differentials have any rela-
tion with exchange rate movements.
1
8 Clearly, our results should be taken as
indicative only.
Again using annual data for the same group of twenty-one countries plus
the United States for the floating-rate period, 1973-92, we constructed the
annual interest rate differential, using three-year government bond rates, and
the three-year rate of exchange rate depreciation against the U.S. dollar.
1
9 For
the pooled data, we obtained the following results:
(34) A3s,+3 = 2.599 +0.596(*, - 0 + r\t,
(1.656) (0.195)
R
2 = 0.066, pooled data, annual data, whole sample,
N = 420, x
2(l) = 4.72,
(0.038)
where figures in parentheses below coefficient estimates are method-of-
moments corrected standard errors, and x
2(l) is a Wald test statistic for the null
hypothesis that the slope coefficient is unity (figures below it in parentheses
denote the marginal significance level). Equation (34) is typical in the sense
that the R
2 is low and the slope coefficient significantly different from unity
at the 5 percent level. It is, however, untypical in that the slope coefficient
is positive.
To investigate the effects of the size of the interest differential on the perfor-
mance of the uncovered interest parity condition, we ordered the data by the
size of the absolute interest differential and reestimated the relation for each
of the four quartiles. For the first quartile (i.e., smallest values of \it - i*\),
we obtained
(35) A35,+3 = 4.159 - 2.9990; - O + \,
(3.243) (1.343)
R
2 = 0.036, pooled data, first quartile, N = 105, X
2U) = 8.851,
(0.003)
18. The view that forward premia or interest differentials have little relation with exchange rate
movements appears to be a widespread conclusion of the literature: "Forward premia contain little
information regarding subsequent exchange rate changes. As emphasized by Dornbusch (1980),
Mussa (1979), and Frenkel (1981), exchange rate changes over the recent period of floating seem
to have been largely unanticipated" (Cumby and Obstfeld 1984, 139).
19. Because the interest rates are expressed in annualized terms, it was appropriate to multiply
them by three in order to put them into three-year terms. We used ordinary least squares with a
method-of-moments correction to the estimated covariance matrix to allow for heteroskedasticity
and moving-average errors.282 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
which exhibits the characteristic negative slope coefficient and a lower R
2.
For the second quartile, the result was
(36) A35f+3 = 5.208 - 0.798(ir - 0 + U
(1.732) (0.475)
R
2 = 0.024, pooled data, second quartile, N = 105, x
2(l) = 14.345,
(0.000)
which shows a very typical slope coefficient estimate that is closer to minus
unity than plus unity and an even smaller R
2.
For the third quartile, we obtained
(37) A35f+3= -1.405+ 0.609 (i, - O + fj,,
(2.841) (0.329)
R
2 = 0.046, pooled data, third quartile, N = 105, x
2(l) = 1-409,
(0.235)
while, for the fourth quartile (i.e., the largest values of \ir — i*\), the resulting
estimate was
(38) A35f+3 = 11.121 + 0.5200; - O + fj,
(7.460) (0.273)
R
2 = 0.079, pooled data, fourth quartile, N = 105, x
2(l) = 3.087.
(0.079)
It is interesting to note that, for the third and fourth quartiles, the slope coef-
ficient is insignificantly different from unity at the 5 percent level. However,
although there is some improvement in the goodness of fit, the /?
2's are still
quite low, and the slope coefficients are not in fact significantly different from
zero at the 5 percent level.
As in the analysis of PPP, the next step was to average the data temporally.
Using pooled five-year averages for the data for the whole sample, we obtained
the following estimate:
(39) A3s,+3 = 0.632 + 0.751(ir - O + f),, (2.020) (0.171)
R
2 = 0.190, pooled data, five-year averages, whole sample,
N = 84, x
2(l) = 2.124.
(0.145)
Equation (39) is quite impressive in the sense that the goodness of fit has risen
dramatically from the unaveraged cases—by a factor of twenty-five or more.
Moreover, the slope coefficient is now strongly significantly different from
zero and insignificantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. These effects
with respect to the goodness of fit and the slope coefficient are even more283 Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Macro Approach?
marked when we consider the results of running the same regressions using
data that have been time averaged over ten or twenty years:
(40) A35r+3 = 0.706 + 1.075(if - ij) + fjf, (1.942) (0.111)
R
2 = 0.400, pooled data, ten-year averages, whole sample,
N = 42, x
2(l) = 0.461;
(0.497)
(41) A35,+3 = -2.721 + 1.481(1, - O + %
(1.556) (0.293)
R
2 - 0.772, pooled data, twenty-year averages, whole sample,
N = 42, x
2(l) = 2.697.
(0.100)
Given the plethora of results on uncovered interest rate parity that have
found little or no empirical connection between interest rates and the exchange
rate or, if anything, have found negative covariation between the interest differ-
ential or forward premium and the rate of depreciation, these results are very
striking and quite intriguing. Moreover, as we noted above, we have used a
ready-made data set from the IFS (International Financial Statistics, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund) and have not spent a great deal of time worrying about
aligning maturity dates, checking that the instruments are identical in all rele-
vant respects across countries, and so on. These shortcomings in the data set
would be most relevant if we did not find evidence of uncovered interest rate
parity in the averaged data; as it is, they serve only to underscore the strength
of the relation that we appear to be unearthing.
8.3.3 Interpretation
In this section, we have shown that very simple macro fundamentals—rela-
tive inflation or relative interest rates—have poor explanatory power with re-
spect to variations in exchange rate movements even over the one-year horizon.
Taking five-, ten-, and twenty-year averages, however, we found that a strong
proportionality between average exchange rate depreciation and average move-
ments in the fundamentals begins to emerge. The analysis is thus indicative of
something that Rick and lisa knew long ago: the fundamental things apply as
time goes by. Moreover, the analysis also suggests that the variation of devia-
tions from the fundamentals appears to be inversely related to the size of the
movements in the underlying fundamentals.
Our interpretation of these results is that, while the nominal exchange rate
is extremely hard to distinguish from a random walk even at the one-year hori-
zon, a simple macro fundamentals-based model outperforms the random walk
at horizons of five years or longer. To see this clearly, note that the n-year
average annual change in the exchange rate is defined as284 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
(43) (l/n)j>>s,+1- = d/n)(st+n - s,).
i=0
Thus, finding that the n-year average exchange rate change is explained by
macro fundamentals is equivalent to finding that the «-year-ahead random-
walk forecast is beaten in sample by a simple macro fundamentals model.
The results also tell us something about the nature of deviations from the
fundamentals. The change in the exchange rate can be defined as the sum of a
component that is explained by movements in the macro fundamentals (such
as relative inflation or relative nominal interest rates, or whatever macro vari-
ables that, in turn, determine them), Ft, and a component that is unexplained
by the macro fundamentals, U,:
(43) As, - F, + Ur
When As, is averaged over periods of five years or more, the estimated slope
coefficient from a regression of As, onto Ft tends toward unity, and the R
2 rises
dramatically, a result that holds for both the PPP and the UIP (uncovered inter-
est rate parity) analyses. This implies that the variance of the movement in the
exchange rate unexplained by the macro fundamentals declines dramatically
over periods of five years or more, which must mean that the year-by-year time-
series errors cancel out approximately:
n
(44) (l/n)X
 u,+i * °' forn > 5 years.
i = 0
Thus, there appears to be little effect from omitting Ut from the regressions
using averaged data. However, the fact that the estimated slope coefficient in
the regressions using annual, unaveraged data is quite different from the esti-
mates obtained using the averaged data suggests that the unexplained compo-
nent is correlated with the component of the change explained by the macro
fundamentals at the annual level:
(45) Corr(F,, U) # 0.
One interpretation of our results is that averaging Ut provides a filter that
vastly reduces the variance of the disturbance term and that much of this reduc-
tion is in terms of reduced covariation of the residual with the fundamental.
This covariance, of course, would also be reduced if we had truly exogenous
fundamentals or instruments for the fundamentals.
Thus, our analysis suggests the following. First, short-run deviations of the
exchange rate, from the path consistent with the macro fundamentals alone,
are responsible for the greater proportion of the short-run variation in nominal
exchange rates. Second, these deviations apparently cancel out over periods of
five years or more. Third, and perhaps most puzzling, the deviations appear to
be correlated with the fundamentals themselves in the annual data.285 Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Macro Approach?
8.4 Conclusion: What's Wrong with the Conventional
Macro Approach?
The empirical work summarized in sections 8.1 and 8.2 suggests that, for
industrial countries during "normal times" (i.e., when they are not experienc-
ing economic pathologies such as a hyperinflation), conventional macro funda-
mental models of exchange rate behavior are incapable of explaining the
greater proportion of the variation in nominal exchange rate movements. It is
apparent that there are important influences, not on the list of standard macro
fundamentals, that affect short-run exchange rate behavior, and standard
macro-based models perform poorly when subjected to standard time-series
econometric testing—typically providing poor in-sample fits and miserable
postsample predictive performance. Hence, there seems to be little profes-
sional disagreement with the view that, as a guide to the short-run behavior of
the major exchange rates, exchange rate models based on macro fundamentals
have largely failed.
The macro-based models have, to some extent, been rehabilitated in studies
that have used cointegration or error-correction-type models to forecast the
exchange rate. These studies, however, in common with recent cointegration
studies on exchange rates and purchasing power parity, provide evidence for
the view that it is the longer-run or low-frequency movements in exchange
rates that are correlated with the traditional macro fundamentals, while the
shorter run movements are poorly understood or, to use the applied researcher's
euphemism, "noisy."
Some generic evidence on the relevance of economic fundamentals for
short-run exchange rate behavior is provided in a recent study by Flood and
Rose (1993). Observing the increased volatility of exchange rates under float-
ing as opposed to fixed exchange rate regimes, these authors argue that any
tentatively adequate exchange rate model should have fundamentals that are
also much more volatile during floating-rate regimes. In fact, they find little
shift in the volatility of economic fundamentals suggested by flexible-price or
sticky-price monetary models across different nominal exchange rate regimes
for a number of OECD exchange rates. Similar evidence is reported by Baxter
and Stockman (1989). More generally, a number of studies have noted that,
under the recent float, nominal exchange rates have shown much greater vari-
ability than important macroeconomic fundamentals such as price levels and
real incomes (e.g., Dornbusch and Frankel 1988; Frankel and Froot 1990; Mar-
ston 1989).
2
0 Again, this suggests that there are speculative forces at work in
20. Some analyses suggest that exchange rate volatility can change dramatically across regimes
even though the volatility of the macro fundamentals does not. This point was crucial, e.g., in the
Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model and in the Krugman (1991) target zone model. In both
these models, and in rational expectations models in general, the Lucas critique applies, and the
form of the reduced-form relation between the exchange rate and the fundamentals is not invariant286 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
the foreign exchange market that are not reflected in the usual menu of macro-
economic fundamentals: given the exhaustive interrogation of the macro fun-
damentals in this respect over the last twenty years, it would seem that our
understanding of the short-run behavior of exchange rates is unlikely to be
further enhanced by further examination of the macro fundamentals. And it is
in this context that new work on the microstructure of the foreign exchange
market seems both warranted and promising.
The results of the research program into the speculative efficiency of the
foreign exchange market also have important implications for the new research
program into the microstructure of foreign exchange markets as well as the
more conventional, macro-based approach. In particular, the rejection of the
simple speculative efficiency hypothesis as applied to the foreign exchange
market and the stylized empirical fact of a negative covariation between the
rate of depreciation and the forward premium challenges conventional, macro-
based approaches to the foreign exchange market since it suggests that one
cannot take for granted many of the efficiency conditions that are typically
subsumed in macro-based exchange rate models. Even under the assumption
of risk aversion alongside that of rational expectations, the stylized fact of the
so-called negative discount bias is very hard to explain (Fama 1984). More-
over, the evidence, from studies employing survey data, that foreign exchange
market participants are neither risk averse nor conform to the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis suggests that the heterogeneity of agents' expectations across
the foreign exchange market—itself highlighted in some recent survey data
studies—may itself be an important feature determining short-run exchange
rate behavior. The processes by which information is obtained and dissemin-
ated throughout markets is not amenable to analysis within a standard macro
approach but is clearly of major importance given heterogeneity of agents'
expectations and information sets (see, e.g., Lyons 1995). Information pro-
cessing may also be at the root of the contagion in volatility across foreign
exchange markets that has been documented.
2
1 Moreover, the finding that a
high proportion of foreign exchange market participants deliberately use ana-
lytic techniques that ignore macro fundamentals (i.e., "technical" or "chartist"
analysis), especially over shorter horizons (Taylor and Allen 1992), under-
scores the importance of allowing for the interaction of diverse forces in the
short-run determination of exchange rates (Goodhart 1988; Frankel and Froot
1990).
to the policy regime. To circumvent this well-known critique as well as the possibility that the
presence of exchange rate bubbles may be regime dependent, Flood and Rose (1993) studied ex-
change rate and fundamentals volatility in structural equations rather than reduced-form expres-
sions so that their conclusions are close to immune to the Lucas critique and bubbles issue. We
say "close to immune" because it could be that exchange rate policy change results in structural
coefficient drift, but this would be a thin reed on which to base exchange rate models.
21. So-called meteor showers (Engle, Ito, and Lin 1990).287 Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Macro Approach?
The additional empirical results reported in this paper underscore the view
that empirical work on macro-based exchange rage models has been hampered
by "contamination" of the data with a high degree of short-run noise. Industrial
countries are different from each other, but the differences in exchange
rate fundamentals change very slowly through time, while exchange rate
time series show comparatively huge variation. To investigate this question,
we work with a panel of data on twenty-two industrialized countries (in-
cluding the United States) during the recent floating exchange rate era. In our
investigation, we suppress noisy time-series variation in a series of steps. We
first study two very simple exchange rate relations, relative purchasing power
parity and uncovered interest rate parity, with annual data, then with five-
year averaged, ten-year averaged, and, finally, twenty-year averaged data.
Formally, as we temporally average the data, we also temporally average the
time-series disturbances until, eventually, they disappear, leaving us with a
cross-sectional model apparently purged of temporal noise. We find that the
simple fundamentals models work extremely well in the pure cross section,
with inflation or interest rate differentials explaining a very high proportion
of the cross-sectional variation in exchange rate movements. We have,
therefore, provided some additional evidence that the macro fundamentals
should not be dismissed entirely. It is clear that the macro fundamentals
in an important sense "set the parameters" within which exchange rates
move but that these parameters are very broad indeed over the short run.
Developing microstructural models of short-run exchange rate movements
within these wide parameters is the challenge that researchers in this field
now face.288 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
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Note: OLS stands for ordinary least squares and WLS for weighted least squares, using the abso-
lute values of the regressor as weights. Oj denotes results for the ith quartile of the pooled sample
when it is ordered according to the absolute magnitude of the regressor (so that Q4 contains the
largest absolute values of the regressor). Figures in parentheses below coefficient estimates are
estimated standard errors (and are heteroskedasticity robust for the OLS results); those below test
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lute values of the regressor as weights. Qi denotes results for the ith quartile of the pooled sample
when it is ordered according to the absolute magnitude of the regressor (so that Q4 contains the
largest absolute values of the regressor). Figures in parentheses below coefficient estimates are
estimated standard errors (and are heteroskedasticity robust for the OLS results); those below test










































































Note: OLS stands for ordinary least squares and WLS for weighted least squares, using the abso-
lute values of the regressor as weights. HI denotes results for the first half of the pooled sample
when it is ordered according to the absolute magnitude of the regressor and H2 the second half of
the ordered sample (so that H2 contains the largest absolute values of the regressor). Figures in
parentheses below coefficient estimates are estimated standard errors (and are heteroskedasticity










































































Note: OLS stands for ordinary least squares and WLS for weighted least squares, using the abso-
lute values of the regressor as weights. HI denotes results for the first half of the pooled sample
when it is ordered according to the absolute magnitude of the regressor and H2 the second half of
the ordered sample (so that H2 contains the largest absolute values of the regressor). Figures in
parentheses below coefficient estimates are estimated standard errors (and are heteroskedasticity
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Comment Andrew K. Rose
There are basically two parts to this paper. The first (and larger) part is a survey
of the conventional international macroeconomic literature on floating ex-
change rates. This work, closely related to a series of papers by Ronald Mac-
Donald and Taylor, is a well-balanced, thorough survey of the evidence on
exchange rate determination. The authors survey four classes of theoretical
models of exchange rate determination and show that the empirical perfor-
mance of these models is quite poor. I find the work eminently reasonable and
have very little to add.
The second part of the paper is relatively short but innovative and interest-
ing. The authors assemble a panel of data on exchange rates and monetary
fundamentals for over twenty countries in the period since the collapse of the
Bretton Woods regime. The authors show that pooling the annual observations
provides only very weak evidence of tendencies to purchasing power parity
(PPP). However, moving to coarser time frequencies seems to give much
stronger evidence of PPP. For instance, using five-year averages gives a higher
regression coefficient in a regression of the exchange rate change on the infla-
tion differential than a similar regression estimated with annual differences
(the goodness of fit improves as well). Averaging the data over ten years im-
proves matters even more. This is true despite the fact that time-averaged data
have fewer outliers than finer-frequency data (as is obvious from the dimen-
sions of figs. 8.5-8.7). It is also true despite the fact that the sample span of
the data (in terms of both country and time coverage) stays constant when
moving between frequencies. In this, as in many contexts, less is more; throw-
ing away short-run variation in exchange and inflation rates leads to a fit more
consistent with one's theoretical priors. It is interesting that throwing away
Andrew K. Rose is associate professor and chair of economics at the Haas School of Business,
University of California, Berkeley, a research fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research,
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within-country time-series variation (and increasing the proportion of
between-country variation) not only does not hurt the regression analysis but
positively helps matters.
I find this result quite interesting. It clearly implies (as the authors point out)
that there is a nontrivial correlation between the regression disturbance and the
inflation differential that leads to a biased coefficient at the annual frequency.
But what is the source of this correlation? Perhaps the authors have found out
only that (price index) measurement error is fatal in such simple regressions at
short- and medium-run frequencies. On the other hand, this kind of regression
has been criticized by a number of economists in that it is not based on any
underlying theoretical model of either price or exchange rate adjustment so
that the regression coefficients are not structural parameters; in addition, there
is no obvious alternative hypothesis posed. Exploring this result further, and
trying to pin down the source of the correlation, remains an interesting and
important task for future research. However, unlike many comparable tasks in
international macroeconomics, it is a manifestly promising avenue of research
since the results are consistent with the prior beliefs of many economists (in-
cluding me), namely, that theories like PPP work well in the long run but are
barely detectable in the short run.
Thus, this paper has performed two valuable tasks. First, it has demonstrated
the lack of empirical success of conventional macroeconomic exchange rate
models. Second, it has produced an interesting set of results on model fit in
both the short and the long run. However, my one criticism of it is that the
authors could be more forceful in pinning down the specific failures of the
macroeconomic approach to exchange rates that can potentially be answered
with microstructure analysis. We have the opportunity to set the agenda for
microstructural work; it is important to lend focus to this emerging literature
at an early stage. Here is my wish list of important topics in which we should
be interested (many are related):
1. First is the role of noise trading and bubbles. Can microstructural work
explain the evidence of apparent excessive volatility in floating foreign ex-
change markets (derived from news regressions, the poor fit of macro equa-
tions, and potentially the literature on deviations from uncovered interest par-
ity)? Can noise trading explain the high volume on foreign exchange markets?
How about the apparent short-run near irrelevance of macroeconomic factors?
2. What leads to the heterogeneous beliefs manifestly apparent in foreign
exchange markets? Is the source of the heterogeneity disagreements about
macroeconomic phenomena, models of the economy, or something com-
pletely different?
3. How does intervention fit in? Why is it taken so seriously by both market
participants and central banks when the macroeconomic presumption is that
sterilized intervention is almost irrelevant? Is there a microstructural reason
why intervention should be kept secret?296 Robert P. Flood and Mark P. Taylor
4. Can microstructure analysis shed light on how the credibility of a foreign
exchange authority (trying to limit exchange rate fluctuations) is determined?
We know that macroeconomic phenomena are not all that important.
5. Can microstructure analysis explain the apparent preference of central
banks for fixed or managed exchange rates? In general, how are issues of re-
gime choice affected by micro features?
6. What is the behavior of market participants like in times of "unusual"
activity, especially speculative attacks and hyperinflations? For instance, are
micro phenomena relevant in precipitating or exacerbating speculative attacks?
7. Can microstructure analysis shed light on the apparent evidence of "con-
tagion/infection" effects witnessed during the 1992-93 exchange rate mecha-
nism crisis? In general, what are the spillovers between different foreign ex-
change markets? Are there externalities between these and other asset markets?
8. Do the microstructural features of foreign exchange markets have im-
portant consequences for hedging? If so, are there important effects on interna-
tional trade flows?
9. Can microstructure explain the well-established large and persistent de-
viations from uncovered interest parity?
In summary, the paper by Flood and Taylor is a valuable contribution in two
respects: it provides a clean survey of the floating exchange rate literature, and
it provides some intriguing new evidence on short- and long-run exchange rate
behavior. The authors have convincingly demonstrated that macroeconomic
models have not provided a satisfactory answer to the key question of exchange
rate determination. However, it is still my belief that the macroeconomic analy-
sis was after the right question, and I would urge us all to keep our collective
eyes on the prize: Why do floating exchange rates fluctuate so much? Why do
fixed exchange rates both persist the way they do and collapse? And what are
the consequences for all this for international trade, macroeconomic policy,
and foreign exchange market policies?
Comment Lars E. O. Svensson
Flood and Taylor's paper is a fine survey of theories of exchange rate determi-
nation and empirical tests of these theories. It also presents interesting results
in favor of long-run purchasing power parity.
One of the main points of the survey is to emphasize the by now well-known
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situation that existing theories cannot predict and explain short-run exchange
rate movements during floating exchange rate regimes and, more specifically,
that existing theories cannot outbeat a random walk.
This unfortunate situation refers to floating exchange rates. I would like to
add that, for fixed exchange rate regimes, the situation is different, in a particu-
lar aspect. Real-world fixed exchange rates usually have bands within which
exchange rates fluctuate; the Bretton Woods system had a bandwidth of ± 1
percentage point; previously ERM (exchange rate mechanism), the European
exchange rate cooperation, had a bandwidth of either ±2.25 or ±6 percentage
points, whereas after the July 1993 crisis the bandwidth was increased to ± 15
percentage points (with the exception of the Dutch gulden/deutsche mark ex-
change rate). It turns out that it is much easier to explain and predict exchange
rate movements within such bands than to predict freely floating exchange
rates.
Table 8C.1 (from Svensson [1993, table 3]; see that paper for details) shows
typical regression results for fixed exchange rate regimes with bands. The table
shows, for six ERM currencies, regressions of the rate of depreciation within
the band during the next three months (relative to the deutsche mark) on the
current exchange rate (x), the currency's three-month Euro interest rate (/), and
the deutsche mark three-month Euro rate (/*). The intercepts are allowed to
differ across periods between realignment dates. If exchange rates within
bands were martingales, the /?
2's in these equations would be close to zero, and
the coefficients of exchange rates and interest rates would not be significantly
different from zero. Instead, we see that the /?
2's lie between 0.26 and 0.62 and
that all coefficients for the exchange rate are negative and significantly differ-
ent from zero (Newey-West standard errors are reported within parentheses).
When the currency is weak, it will on average appreciate. This is of course just
mean reversion within the band, which perhaps is not so surprising.
However, mean reversion is not the end of the story. We also see that the
coefficient for the own-currency Euro interest rate is negative and significant
in four cases out of six, whereas the coefficient for the foreign interest rate is
positive and significant in two cases. This sign pattern is consistent with central
banks engaging in interest rate smoothing. When the domestic-currency inter-
est rate (or the interest rate differential relative to the deutsche mark) is high,
the currency will in the future on average appreciate relative to the deutsche
mark. This expected appreciation will prevent the domestic-currency interest
rate from being even higher. Put differently, by inducing an expected apprecia-
tion of the currency, the central bank prevents the domestic interest rate from
being even higher.
This association between high interest rate differentials and future expected
appreciation within the band may appear to be counter to uncovered interest
parity, which predicts an association between high interest rate differentials
and future expected depreciation. However, the latter association is between

















































































































































































Note: OLS with Newey-West standard errors within parentheses (T lags, T = 65). Regressand is
(xl+7 - x,)hdt (%/year), idt = 63/261; regressors are *,(%), i] (%/year), and if
T (%/year), where x
is ln(BF/DM),..., ln(NG/DM), i] is the T maturity BF,..., NG Euro interest rate, and t*
T is the
T maturity DM Euro interest rate. A vertical bar for a realignment date indicates that the corre-
sponding currency was not realigned and that the estimate straight above applies. Interest rates for
IP were not available before October 1981. The second regime for Danish krone/deutsche mark is
too short to be estimated. For details, see Svensson (1993). BF = Belgian franc; DM = deutsche
mark; DK = Danish krone; FF = French franc; IL = lira; IP = Irish pound; NG = Dutch gulden.299 Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Macro Approach?
alignments, whereas the former is between high interest rate differentials and
expected depreciation relative to central parity. For a sample period during
which a realignment is expected with some probability but does not occur
owing to the shortness of the sample (the peso problem), high interest rate
differentials will be associated with future realized total appreciation, even if
expectations are rational. If expectations are not rational but exaggerate the
probability of a realignment, for instance, in a situation in which a central bank
is struggling to establish the credibility of a fixed exchange rate regime, high
interest rate differentials will be associated with future total realized apprecia-
tions also for longer sample periods. Thus, central banks' interest rate smooth-
ing within exchange rate bands may contribute to the often observed empirical
rejection of uncovered interest parity.
Additional evidence for interest rate smoothing within exchange rate bands
is presented in figure 8C.1 (from Svensson [1994, fig. 2d]; see that paper for
details). The top panel's thin curve shows a time series of deviations from cen-
tral parity of the Swedish krona (relative to the currency basket that the krona
was pegged to prior to May 1992 when the pegging to the ECU [European
currency unit] began). The horizontal dotted lines show the bandwidth, ±1.5
percentage points. The thin curves in the second and third panels from the top
show the Swedish krona and currency basket one-month interest rates, respec-
tively. The curve in the fourth panel from the top shows estimates of the mar-
ket's realignment expectations (expected rates of realignment). Whereas the
thin curves show the actual historical development of these series, the thick
curves in the first and second panels from the top show the result of a simula-
tion where the central bank faces historical disturbances but pursues an optimal
policy according to an objective function that puts certain weight on both ex-
change rate and interest rate smoothing.
Let us look at just one incident. In the fall of 1990, expectations of a devalu-
ation rose dramatically. In the fourth panel from the top, we see that the ex-
pected rate of realignment peaked in the fall of 1990. Everything else equal,
this would show up in a one-to-one increase in the domestic-currency interest
rate. Instead, we see in the second panel from the top that the domestic interest
rate increased by much less (the actual increase and the optimal increase coin-
cide in this incident). As can be seen in the top panel, Sveriges Riksbank al-
lowed the krona to depreciate within the band (somewhat less than the optimal
policy). This created an expected appreciation for the krona that dampened the
effect of the increased realignment expectations on the domestic interest rate.
The resulting expected rate of appreciation of the krona is displayed in the fifth
panel from the top.
Hence, in contrast to what is the case for floating exchange rates, for ex-
change rates within bands exchange rate movements can be both predicted and
to some extent explained, for instance, in terms of central banks smoothing
interest rates. Of course, it would be better to be able to predict and explain



















Fig. 8C.1 Evidence of interest rate smoothing
Note: x is percentage deviation of exchange rate from central parity; i
T and z*
T are domestic and
foreign one-month interest rates, respectively; g
T is expected rate of realignment; T equals four
weeks, dt = one week. Thin curve: actual. Thick curve: optimal. Dashed line: mean. For details,
see Svensson (1994).
levels in terms of levels of other contemporaneous macro variables, but it is
still of some interest that exchange rate movements within bands are systematic
and also not exclusively characterized by mean reversion.
I missed in Flood and Taylor's survey a discussion of international macro
problems or puzzles where a microstructure approach might help. A list of
such problems/puzzles is discussed extensively in Andrew Rose's comment on
Flood and Taylor. Let me just mention two such problems/puzzles that are
on my own wish list.
The effects on exchange rates of sterilized central bank intervention may be
suitable to analyze with a microstructure approach. Most macro studies find
little or no effect of sterilized intervention. If they are correct, why do central301 Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Macro Approach?
banks keep doing it? Some studies emphasize a signaling effect, namely, that
sterilized interventions signal future nonsterilized interventions. If the signal-
ing effect is the important one, why are central banks often secretive about
their interventions? And why aren't there better ways to signal changes in future
monetary policy?
Some central bank officials have suggested to me that herd behavior in the
foreign exchange market may be exploited by central banks. If the central bank
secretly through intermediaries can convey the impression that someone other
than the central bank is suddenly starting to buy the currency, the herd might
follow. This way the central bank would then be able to push or pull the ex-
change rate in desired directions. These issues might be suitable for a micro-
structure approach.
Another such issue is speculative attacks, in particular, central banks' de-
fense against speculative attack. For instance, during the dramatic defense of
the Swedish krona in September 1992, with a 500 percent overnight rate, the
foreign exchange market for kronor and the Swedish Treasury bills market
seemed paralyzed. Instead of a strong inflow of kronor, very little trade oc-
curred. Huge spreads were quoted on Swedish T-bills, indicating that no one
wanted to trade. One reason is that it became almost impossible to price a
short-term bill since the uncertainty about the future overnight rate was enor-
mous. Who knew whether it would come down to reasonable levels within
three, seven, or fourteen days? A related issue is to what extent the increased
practice of trading rules, dynamic hedging, etc. affects central banks' defense
against speculative attack. As the paper by Garber and Spencer (chap. 6 in this
volume) demonstrates, this is another suitable area for a microstructure
approach.
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